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 The Colbert Report was a satirical, political, and “fake” news show that lasted for almost 
a decade on the Comedy Central Network.  Although many scholars have argued the program 
was less impactful and influential than Jon Stewart’s The Daily Show, phenomena such as the 
“Colbert Bump” show a definite impact on the political lives of many Americans.  Using four 
quantitative surveys from 2008 to 2012, this thesis investigates the effects of watching The 
Colbert Report on individuals’ political knowledge and political participation.  Results indicate 
non-Republican viewers increased their political knowledge, but not participation, from watching 
the show.  The educational effect was more prevalent than The Daily Show and other political 
news programs.  Results indicate a divide based on partisanship regarding how media educates 
and incentivizes participation in politics. 
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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
Humor has always been a way to break down the rough boundaries of discussing and 
reviewing political life. Since the time of the ancient Greeks, political humor has been used to 
entertain viewers while critiquing political leaders, social conventions, and authorities.  Of 
course, political humor has changed since the time of the Greeks, but its general function has 
remained the same (Schutz, 1977).  Political cartoons, radio broadcasts, and television programs 
now can reach multitudes of people instantly and influence what and how they think.  From 
Saturday Night Live to South Park, or The Onion to Between Two Ferns, many players are 
currently in this space, carving out market share and reaching out to new viewers across the 
United States and the world.  No matter the form of its delivery, nor the importance it has been 
given, political humor has always played an interesting and powerful role in many societies’ 
political histories.  Recently, “fake news” shows like The Colbert Report, henceforth TCR, have 
enriched the field of political humor through its unique mixture of educational and entertaining 
programming.  
TCR aired weekly on the television network Comedy Central from 2005 to 2014.  It 
featured Stephen Colbert as a conservative political pundit based somewhat on Bill O’Reilly1 
from Fox News’ show The O’Reilly Factor.  While Colbert would state that education was not 
the main goal of his show’s many political stunts and that he was purely an entertainer (Mcgrath, 
2012), many have posed the question of how much influence Colbert had on his audience and the 
American political system. Although previous work has examined the effects of political humor, 
Colbert’s show brings serious questions to the discussion because of its unique style and 
position. 
                                               
1
 O’Reilly was adoringly referred to as “Papa Bear” by Stephen. 
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TCR is seen as a new kind of political satire, due to its use of dual implicit and explicit 
messages, that delves away from the styles of former political satirists like Jay Leno and David 
Letterman (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).  For example, a typical Colbert play was to criticize 
Democratic President Barack Obama’s political successes in such a ridiculous manner that the 
only interpretation could be implicit support for Obama.  In this example the direct and explicit 
message is “Obama is doing a bad job”, but the intended implicit message is “Obama is doing a 
good job”.  Although one might believe this incongruence in messaging would prove ineffective, 
Colbert’s style was quite brilliant, as both conservatives and liberals enjoyed the show and 
interpreted it through their own political lenses (Gaines, 2007; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).  In 
social science literature, this seeing what one wants to see is referred to as motivated reasoning.   
Through motivated reasoning, TCR viewers most likely saw and processed messages that 
were congruent with their previously formed political beliefs (Lodge & Taber, 2000).  
Conservatives saw Colbert’s direct conservative messages while liberals only processed the 
implicit liberal ones because each group was actively seeking out entertainment and political 
news congruent with their beliefs.  Even if viewers did take seriously Colbert’s inconsistent 
message, this even could strengthen their already formed beliefs by causing them to search their 
memories for consistent information to balance out Colbert’s opposing message (Redlawsk, 
2002).  Because of this ability to have two messages at one time through satire, Colbert’s style 
was a direct contrast with his counterpart on the same network, Jon Stewart on The Daily Show.   
Even though Stewart would sometimes delve into satire, he was known for his use of 
stirring monologues and funny commentary mostly performed in an explicit manner with a direct 
and left leaning message.  There were very few implicit messages targeted towards conservatives 
in Stewart’s show, and therefore his ability to reach and influence conservative viewers was 
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quite less than TCR.  Colbert’s stronger pull towards conservatives through his show is evident in 
a slightly higher percentage of total viewers identifying as Republicans in 2012 than The Daily 
Show (Pew Research Center, 2012).  Unlike Stewart’s more explicit messaging, Colbert always 
performed in his satirical character never explicitly informing his audience of his intended liberal 
messages; however, it is clear that Stephen Colbert was just the opposite of the right-wing 
conservative he portrayed.  
Perhaps because of this unique and appealing satirical style, TCR had a large viewership, 
with one academic survey from February 2007 showing 12 percent of young adults watching it 
for their source of news (Lewis, 2008). With such a large viewership receiving political news 
from TCR, there existed a large potential to significantly impact the political knowledge and 
engagement of its viewership. If such an effect did occur, one must ask how much more 
impactful was TCR over other sources of news?  Was there something about the show’s style that 
caused it to be an effective political motivator and educator? This study hypothesizes that 
watching TCR had a significant and positive effect on both political knowledge and participation 
because the program effectively educated and evoked political engagement through a type of 
politically engaging satire.  Although one might believe this to be solely a historical analysis no 
longer relevant because TCR’s final episode occurred in December 2014, this study still holds an 
important discussion due to the continued use of humor and satire in other political shows such 
as Last Week Tonight with John Oliver and The Daily Show with Trevor Noah.  If TCR was an 
effective educator and political motivator, one should be able to identify what benefits society 
has lost with the absence of the program.  Finally, this research maintains relevance because it 
analyzes ways the ways in which political news media can increase some of the most democratic 
principles for democracies, especially the United States. 
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As Delli Carpini and Keeter state in the preface to their book What Americans Know 
About Politics and Why It Matters, “… an informed citizenry is a common thread that implicitly 
ties together all theories of democracy.  [There is] consistent support for the idea that given the 
appropriate information, citizens are capable of making rational political choices.” (Delli Carpini 
& Keeter, 1996, xii).  A politically engaged and knowledgeable public is important to the most 
basic functioning and maintenance of democratic principles.  If the public is not informed nor 
motivated to participate in politics, it will not be able to act towards its own self-interest.  
Determining which factors can increase political knowledge and participation is important 
because it can help many political groups, from policy makers to activists, accomplish their 
varied goals. This being so, determining if TCR positively affected these factors is a theoretically 
important study not just for individual Americans; it is important for democracy and the entire 
American political system. 
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CHAPTER II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Importance of Political Knowledge and Participation 
In short, the consensus about Americans’ knowledge of and participation in politics is as 
consistent as it is bleak; sadly, Americans do not spend much effort on politics compared to 
people in other countries (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). Since this was studied in the middle 
of the 20
th
 century with the seminal work of The American Voter (Campbell et al. 1960), it has 
been shown that only a small percentage of Americans can be described as sophisticated in their 
levels of political thinking.  Even in the face of a dramatically different societal context in the 
21
st
 century, the means by which voters ultimately decide their voting choices has not changed 
since the 1960’s (Lewis-Beck, 2008).  America has gained more political sophisticates since the 
1960’s (Lewis-Beck, 2008), but the overall level of American political sophistication is still quite 
low.  To give some current examples, a large percentage of Americans cannot correctly identify 
which political party currently has majority control in Congress (Annenberg Public Policy 
Center, 2014), and voter turnout has been steadily decreasing with levels currently hovering 
between 50% to 60% for presidential elections and even lower for midterm, state, and local 
elections (FairVote, 2016).  This is troublesome for democratic success.  When 65% of 
Americans cannot name at least one of their political representatives (Mendes, 2013), how can 
they hold them accountable and make informed political decisions?   
For these reasons, political knowledge and participation are important characteristics 
which affect all aspects of American political life; this work will address how political media can 
raise Americans’ low levels of political sophistication.  The United States suffers a case of a 
“paradox of modern democracy”; the informed and participatory citizenry for which it was 
constructed is not present (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).  There exist many prescriptions and 
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philosophies in political literature that try to fix, and sometimes even justify, these low levels of 
political sophistication, but it is a multi-sided battle.  Political knowledge and political 
participation are intertwined with societal political sophistication, and both will be used as the 
outcome variables of this study.  As Luskin (1990) claims, three factors must be studied to 
understand how publics do or do not become politically sophisticated: exposure to political 
information, ability to synthesize and organize that information, and the motivational forces 
behind them.  Once there is an understanding of how individuals know what they know, why 
they act the way they act, and how media can play a role in these political efforts, predictions can 
be made about how individuals and publics can become more politically sophisticated. 
Political Knowledge 
Obtaining facts about politics is one of the necessary conditions for democracy to 
function by and for the people.  This study will utilize Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996, p. 10) 
definition of political knowledge as “the range of factual information about politics that is stored 
in long-term memory”.  Without a broad base of political knowledge across a citizenry, 
democratic accountability would appear impossible, and it would allow representatives the 
ability to not faithfully represent their constituents (Hutchings, 2003).  In addition to the public 
good of a government that is accountable to its citizens, it is unlikely for individual constituents 
to take coherent and intelligent positions on issues when they are politically uninformed.   
As Zaller (1992) demonstrates, politically aware individuals are able to hold more 
considerations and thoughts about political topics in their minds at one time; these individuals 
are also better able to state opinions that are more ideologically consistent with their 
predispositions than politically unaware people.  Most importantly, knowledgeable citizens can 
make political decisions that are congruent with their values (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).  
7 
 
When voting for political candidates, increasing one’s knowledge about the candidates can help 
citizens vote more “correctly” towards their ideological views (Lau & Redlawsk, 1997).  
Knowledgeable citizens are also more likely to hold these consistent political attitudes over time, 
participate in the political process, and be more tolerant towards others’ views (Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1996).  To affect citizens’ voting behavior, citizens must first become aware of an issue, 
have previous knowledge of and engagement with it, and understand what the main political 
parties say about it (Campbell et al. 1960).  These three conditions reinforce the need for certain 
levels of political knowledge in order for citizens to make informed votes.  Some might say these 
conditions can be skirted by cues and heuristics (Lupia, 1994; Gilens & Murakawa, 2002), but 
unfortunately many are not even able to obtain the basic and minimal levels of information to 
even approach being considered politically sophisticated. 
Low levels of political knowledge maintain social inequality, therefore effective 
distribution of political knowledge can help many groups achieve better footing in all aspects of 
life.  Groups in the US that are low in political knowledge such as young, female, and non-white 
citizens are not able to demand equal representation like their more represented older, white, and 
male counterparts (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996) which translates to unequal distribution of 
benefits.  This can be clearly shown by Congress frequently catering its political decisions and 
policies to benefit Whites more than African Americans and Latinos who have lower levels of 
political knowledge (Griffin & Newman, 2008).  This unequal distribution of political capital is 
also seen for citizens with no time or money to spend on becoming politically informed, and 
studies show that poor citizens are less likely to have their political opinions reflected in the 
voting behavior of their representatives (Bartels, 2009).  Political knowledge is one of many 
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gateways for many low-power groups to gain equal access to social resources and power; 
however, it is an extremely difficult hurdle to overcome.   
As Delli Carpini and Keeter (1996) argue, minimally informed groups’ access to political 
knowledge is limited because of their lower ability to attain their goals in the political arena, and 
this inability to accomplish political goals in turn has a reciprocal effect by lowering their 
political engagement and knowledge.  If this chicken-or-the-egg problem were to be broken with 
structural changes, including better education through the media, more political and social 
equality would most likely follow (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996).  Drawing on economic 
thought, “[i]nformation operates like a rising tide that lifts all boats” (Gronke, 2000, p. 109), and 
this rising tide can maintain the functionality and accountability of democracies in addition to 
decreasing intergroup inequality.  Although normatively the ideal of widespread political 
knowledge would find little disagreement, scholars debate about the level of specific information 
necessary for democratic governance to continue.   
Even though the American populace may be politically uninformed, it has been shown 
that heuristics and institutions (such as party labels and political endorsements) can replace 
traditional political knowledge and help citizens make informed decisions (Mondak, 1993; 
Gordon & Segura, 1997; Lau & Redlawsk, 2001; Kinder & Kiewiet, 1981; Druckman, 2001a, b).  
Societies can also compensate for a lack of political knowledge.  “[R]egardless of citizens’ levels 
of factual knowledge about politics, there are institutions embedded in our political system that 
may help citizens to assess the veracity of political actors’ statements and to learn from them,” 
(Boudreau, 2009, p. 288).  Changing the conditions under which information is presented can 
compensate for a lack of political knowledge (Boudreau, 2009).  Per this camp of scholars, 
American democracy can function even in the face of an uninformed public; however, given that 
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increased political sophistication is an important variable which can affect many facets of 
individual behavior (Zaller, 1992), high levels of political knowledge should be an overall goal 
for which democracies should strive.  Becoming informed about politics is only a start towards 
better democratic governance and accountability.  To be useful in the democratic process, 
citizens must act on such correct information in order to benefit themselves individually and 
collectively in their groups. 
Political Participation 
 Democratic theory over the centuries has held a mixed importance of the role of citizen 
participation in politics.  The early founders of the US Constitution foresaw both the positives 
and dangers of a fully engaged citizenry, and more recent political theorists have also battled 
with this essential debate (Ekman & Amnå, 2012; Dahlgren, 2013).  For the American context, 
one in which citizens have increasingly disassociated themselves from political institutions like 
voting, it is difficult to argue against incentivizing citizens’ political participation due to such 
current low rates (Putnam, 2000).  It is with this light that many scholars have become heavy 
advocates for political participation and its many different forms.  The most common forms of 
political participation which gather the attention of political scientists are conventional electoral 
behaviors like voting and attending political meetings (Campbell et al. 1954) and non-
conventional activities such as protesting and violent action (Sabucedo & Arce, 1991).  Because 
there exist many definitions of political participation, this research will utilize a very inclusive 
definition created by Conge (1988, p. 247) of “individual or collective action at the national or 
local level that supports or opposes state structures, authorities, and/or decisions regarding 
allocation of public goods.”  As such, political participation may include verbal or non-verbal 
expression, violent or non-violent action, and a variety of intensity (Conge, 1988).  The positives 
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of engaging in many different types of political behavior ranging from rioting to checking 
politicians’ Twitter accounts can be shown to have both individual and societal benefits.  
 Participatory democracy scholars argue that individuals can greatly benefit their personal 
development both politically and morally through increased political action (Pateman, 1970; 
Mason, 1982).  Political participation can develop more responsible political behaviors, more 
intelligent social behaviors, and even more agreement and support towards democracy as a 
whole (Pateman, 1970; Finkel, 1987).  Studies also show that political participation increases 
individuals’ levels of external political efficacy, making them more likely to trust political 
authorities and believe that their government is responsive to their desires (Balch, 1974; Shaffer, 
1981).  Internal efficacy, the feeling of understanding and having an impact on politics, has also 
been shown to be slightly increased by political participation (Finkel, 1985), and a reciprocal 
effect between participation and external efficacy, the belief that the government will respond to 
citizens’ demands, is seen on a stronger scale (Finkel, 1985; Finkel, 1987).  This indicates that 
participation in politics can have a large impact on how people form their political opinions and 
support for government systems at large, and these factors can then reciprocally influence further 
political action. 
 On a societal level, the aggregate of individuals’ political participation has various 
positive effects for a democratic system.  Regime stability and legitimacy can be strengthened 
when citizens engage more with the political system (Ginsberg, 1982), and with political stability 
can come increased confidence in economic systems.  On a more basic level and perhaps quite 
obviously, increased participation such as voting, campaigning, and interacting with public 
officials correlates with higher levels of democracy seen in measures like Vanhanen’s Index of 
Democracy (Booth & Richard, 1998).  However, not only do systems become more democratic 
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with more participation, but democracies’ governance also improves.  General governmental 
effectiveness, control of corruption, and consistency in good governmental management are all 
positively correlated with higher levels of political participation (Nekola, 2006).  If stronger and 
more effective democracy is considered a positive, as most would see it, then it is hard to argue 
against attempts at increasing voter turnout, membership in political groups, and interaction 
between citizens and elected officials for the United States. 
 Through the belief that more political participation and greater political knowledge are 
normative goods for society this paper will view the American political context.  This paper will 
not argue that perfect political participation across all forms is a goal, nor even possible; rather, it 
will argue that increasing American’s already low numbers of political engagement to levels of 
other consolidated democratic countries should be a desirable goal.  Maximizers of the aggregate 
societal benefit should look to increase both of these characteristics in individuals and political 
organizations.  Thousands of political organizations already are making strides to stimulate 
Americans’ political engagement, and one of the main institutions through which these 
campaigns are accomplished is the media.   
Media, and especially political media, has an essential role in incentivizing Americans to 
learn about and engage in politics.  It is a dominant force which cannot be underscored enough in 
the conversation of increasing political engagement in the United States.  In a sense, the fate of 
American democracy depends on the successful transmission of knowledge on a mass scale 
between those who govern and those who are governed.  Political media can bring down 
dictatorships, rally support for wars, and tarnish public officials with nothing more than a single 
tweet.  Most importantly for this study, much literature has shown that what citizens know and 
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how they behave in the political sphere largely depend upon what they learn from political 
media. 
Effects of Political Media Consumption 
Who benefits from media consumption and how it impacts them have always been 
important motifs in the communications literature.  According to the Propaganda Model 
formulated by Herman and Chomsky (2002), “the media serve and propagandize on behalf of the 
powerful societal interests that control and finance them”.  This is congruent with the work on 
public opinion conducted by Zaller (1992) which states that public opinion is dominated and 
controlled by elite discourse and goals in society.  Per these two authors’ models, any effects that 
media consumption (and, as is the focus of this project, political humor) have on viewers is an 
effort by elites to influence behavior and opinions.  It has been shown that while news may be 
critical of elite dialogue, studies have repeatedly shown that political media is constrained in its 
expression as predicted by the Propaganda Model (Boyd-Barrett, 2004; Anderson & Kincaid, 
2013).  Political elites limit how political media present and discuss content and views, and they 
do this to enhance their political goals.  This constrained discourse limits the amount of political 
knowledge that is vital for democracy (Hutchings, 2003).  Some clear examples of this bounded 
expression are the lack of US media coverage of the genocide in East Timor from 1977 to 1999 
and the media’s failure to question the legality of the Vietnam War (Herman & Chomsky, 2002).  
Although elites have the potential to influence many with mass media, not all studies agree that 
consuming mass media is influential on political knowledge and behaviors (Brinkman, 1968; 
Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Chaffee et al. 1970; Baumgartner, 2008; Hoffman & Young, 2011; 
De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Liu et al. 2013). 
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Generally, scholars show a positive effect of political media consumption on increasing 
political participation and knowledge (De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006); however, not all 
media consumption types have the same effect (Robinson & Davis, 1990; Delli Carpini & 
Keeter, 1996; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000; Liu et al. 2013).  These studies overwhelmingly show 
that newspaper use has a larger positive effect on political participation and knowledge than 
television use (Liu et al. 2013; Eveland & Scheufele, 2000), and some even demonstrate a 
negative effect of television news consumption on political knowledge (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 
1996).  The ineffectiveness of television could be attributed its tendency to skew towards lower 
educated people who may have difficulty understanding the information (Neuman et al. 1992), 
yet structural tendencies of television, such as its tendency to loosely connect facts and events, 
could also explain this inability (Graber, 1994).  This influential difference between television 
and newspaper can also be attributed to the differences in political content which they convey.  
Newspapers have been shown to have high levels of political content while television has less 
(De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006); subsequently, consuming news media with low levels of 
political content demonstrates little to no positive effects on political knowledge (De Vreese & 
Boomgaarden, 2006).  Political news media across these two types of media and others can use 
humor to influence viewers, which is strongly supported by many theories. 
Theories and Demand of Political Humor 
Political humor and satire are common techniques used today in modern day politics and 
throughout history (Baumgartner & Morris, 2012) because they are impactful ways to 
communicate messages to people (Brinkman, 1968; Berg & Lippman, 2001).  The most 
frequently used theoretical basis to explain this persuasive power is the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) first proposed by Cacioppo et al. (1986).   
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The ELM states that there are two paths of persuasion: the central route and the 
peripheral route.  The central route is the deliberate and thoughtful consideration of how solid an 
argument is based on the information received.  In contrast, the peripheral route determines 
persuasiveness by a person’s association with cues which are outside of the logical coherence of 
the message.  Each route is used at different times and for different arguments, and personality 
factors, such as need for cognition, can determine the route (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992).   
People use the central route to process persuasion when they are motivated and able to 
think about arguments, and they use the peripheral route when there is no motivation nor ability 
to evaluate an argument.  Attitudes formed via the central route are more impactful and lasting 
than those formed via the peripheral route; however, the peripheral route has more potential for 
persuasion (Petty & Cacioppo, 1996).  Political humor is said to be processed along the 
peripheral route, which makes the receiver less critical of the message and increases the 
likelihood of the receiver being persuaded by it (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).  Many scholars 
utilize ELM as a theoretical base for their research into the effects of political humor 
(Baumgartner, 2007; LaMarre et al. 2014), and there appears to be a supply-side orientation to 
creating political humor.  Essentially, political news media utilize humor to create a larger 
impact on viewers which in turn increases the power of these media.  Although this seems to be a 
clear reason for news media to use political humor, receivers of such messages also have 
reasoning to consume it. 
According to the Uses and Gratifications Theory (McQuail, 1994), political humor 
consumption fulfills needs and desires such as diversion, learning topics to discuss within 
personal relationships, reinforcing personal values, and becoming informed (Lewis, 2008; 
Young, 2013).  It creates an entertaining and educational path through which citizens can learn 
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about political news first hand or liven up the day-to-day news they have already received, both 
of which create a demand by consumers for political humor news programming.  Viewing both 
the ELM and Uses and Gratifications theories together, the demand and supply of political 
humor should be quite high given its influential power and ability to satisfy its viewers’ many 
needs.  Using these theories, scholars have examined the role and impact of political humor news 
on viewers and society. 
Effects of Political Humor 
The field of political humor studies has grown much during the past century, and 
resultant works have shown the many diverse effects it has on consumers.  In one of the earliest 
works on the effects of political humor, Brinkman (1968) found that editorials with political 
cartoons showed some power to affect political opinions of readers, but it was the editorials’ 
content that held more influence than the cartoons themselves.  Although this work showed only 
slight promise for the power of humor in politics, later works would find more support.  Warner 
(2004) found that television parody inspires thought and curiosity to question social situations 
hence increasing the likelihood of being politically knowledgeable.  Satirical news, a unique 
form of political humor news, has also shown a positive effect on viewers’ knowledge of current 
political events (Binford, 2015).  However, studies have shown that viewers of “soft-news” 
political humor shows have inflated perceptions of their own political knowledge (Hollander, 
1995).  In addition to its effects on political knowledge, political participation can also be 
affected by the consumption of political humor. 
 Most studies show that political participation increases when people view more news 
media with political humor (Lee & Kwak, 2014; Becker, 2013; Baumgartner, 2008; Cao & 
Brewer, 2008).  Baumgartner (2008) found that viewing political humor online showed a 
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positive impact on future political participation, and Lee and Kwak (2014) demonstrated that 
consistently viewing sarcastic political media increased people’s political participation.  Specific 
political activities such as attending campaign events and joining political organizations also 
increase with political humor consumption (Cao & Brewer, 2008).  Even though political humor 
has generally been shown to increase political knowledge and participation, one of its biggest 
effects is on opinions of the political system at large. 
One of the most salient effects of political humor is to increase negative attitudes towards 
politics and the news media, hence creating a cynicism towards the entire political sphere (Lee & 
Kwak, 2014; Baumgartner & Morris, 2006; Holbert et al. 2007).  These negative emotions can 
change the way in which people participate and interact with politics (Lee & Kwak, 2014), and 
the view of one’s political efficacy can mediate the interaction between political satire 
consumption and political participation (Hoffman & Young, 2011; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009).  
Also, political humor which is critical of certain policies and politicians can change viewers’ 
opinions about said topics (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).  These studies seem to add to the 
overall importance of political humor on individuals’ multiple political characteristics; these 
multiple effects of political humor have only begun to be studied in relation to TCR. 
Theoretical Importance and Effects of TCR 
 As stated before, TCR received much attention from the American public because of its 
appearance in many parts of the American political sphere.  In terms of its overall importance, 
scholars hold mixed reviews on the power of the show and its ability to impact politics.  TCR 
used its nightly platform to call attention to many specific political issues, social injustices, and 
political scandals of the time (Jones et al. 2012).  Many scholars state that TCR held a critical 
role in democratic society, and ironically, it and other fake news shows like The Daily Show 
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were sometimes seen to be more credible than real news (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).  TCR also 
provided a debate stage where opinions that were not held by the mainstream media could be 
discussed (Meddaugh, 2010).  As shown through Herman and Chomsky’s Propaganda Model 
(2002), this role is very important for establishing true opinions not entirely created by elites.  In 
light of this role, TCR has been shown to be a better critique of mass media and society than 
other fake news programs (Anderson & Kincaid, 2013).   
Anderson and Kincaid (2013) reviewed both The Daily Show and TCR through the 
Propaganda Model to see how much each show would diverge from and critique mainstream 
narratives.  Surprisingly, TCR was found to challenge the status quo of politics more than The 
Daily Show while also following the mainstream narrative.  This is not to say that TCR had the 
ability to influence all of its viewers through its divergent critiques in the same way or power.  In 
fact, political ideology had a large impact on how people perceived and interpreted the show’s 
content and messaging. 
Although TCR was clearly a satire of conservative talk show programs, not everyone was 
able to see behind the satire to his implicit messages.  As discussed before, liberals saw the 
implicit messages behind Colbert’s satire and did not believe he was serious when stating his 
opinions, but conservatives were likely to report Colbert as joking but really meaning what he 
stated (LaMarre et al. 2009).  Others studies agree, stating that although he was implicitly 
critiquing conservative talking points, TCR actually increased positive views of Republican 
policies by both Democratic and Republican viewers (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).  Colbert’s 
satire might not have been effective in changing viewer attitudes towards his “true” beliefs, but 
conservatives and liberals had no doubt that his show was funny and entertaining independent of 
their political leanings (Lamarre et al. 2009).  Because TCR was most likely processed through 
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the peripheral route as predicted by the ELM (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008), there was much 
potential for him to influence the political attitudes, participation, and knowledge of his viewer 
base; however, not many studies have examined these potential impacts of the show. 
While minimal quantitative studies have been conducted with TCR as a separate 
independent variable, there are some studies that do support positive effects of the show on 
political knowledge, participation, and attitudes as predicted by the ELM (Fowler, 2008; Binford, 
2015; Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Hoffman & Young, 2011; LaMarre, 2013; Peterson, 2012).  
For example, the program demonstrated a stark effect towards increasing support for guests who 
appeared on the show.  The “Colbert Bump” is referred to as the dramatic increase in campaign 
donations that both Democratic and Republican politicians receive after appearing on his show 
(Fowler, 2008).  Although not a clear causal relationship of the show’s effects on political 
knowledge and participation, TCR viewers were clearly paying attention to Colbert’s guests and 
remembered their names long enough to donate money to them.  This increased political 
engagement effect has been supported by other studies which show TCR raising viewers’ 
political knowledge (Hardy et al. 2014; Binford, 2015), lowering viewers’ perceptions of their 
political efficacy (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008), and increasing their political participation 
(Hoffman & Young, 2011; Peterson, 2012). 
Gaps in Research 
There are many gains to be made in political humor literature in general and specifically 
towards literature about TCR.  One thing that is difficult to navigate is the differences between 
political humor, satire, entertainment talk shows, fake news, and real news.  Better distinctions 
and stricter definitions should be made in future scholarly discussions to clear up confusion 
among these terms.  For this research, political satire will be treated as a subcategory of political 
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humor yet completely distinct from it.  Political satire shall refer to humor derived from implicit 
political messaging hidden behind direct explicit messages.  For reference points, TCR will be 
viewed in this research as purely a satirical show due to Colbert’s use of conservative messages 
to state his liberal views, while shows like The Daily Show and Last Week Tonight will be 
viewed as political humor due to their explicit use of liberal messages to convey liberal views.   
Another gap in the literature, as discussed before, is that not much research has been 
conducted on the individual impact that TCR had on viewers’ political characteristics such as 
political knowledge and political participation.  Studies typically combine TCR and The Daily 
Show into a single political satire variable instead of treating them as separate sources of news 
(Peterson, 2012; Binford, 2015; Hoffman & Young, 2011; Brändlin, 2013), and much more 
research has been conducted on individual effects of The Daily Show’s on these outcomes (Lee 
& Kwak, 2014; Cao & Brewer, 2008; Hoffman & Thomson, 2009).  Many times, TCR is left out 
of these quantitative studies.  Studies about TCR tend to be qualitative discussions about its 
differences with other shows and its significance towards media and democracy (Jones et al. 
2012; Meddaugh, 2010); however, these studies fail to explicitly and directly connect TCR to 
empirical and characteristic changes in viewers.  When these quantitative studies have been 
done, TCR is rarely the singular main focus.  
Although it is a difficult task given the amount of variables influencing individuals’ 
political lives, more quantitative research should be conducted to identify paths of causation 
between viewing TCR and political knowledge and participation.  The lack of studies could be 
due to the relatively short time the show was running in comparison to other shows and a general 
understanding that Colbert played second fiddle behind Stewart’s earlier time slots and gravitas.  
Regardless, the show was running for enough time to have multiple impacts on viewers, and if a 
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viewing effect is found for TCR, this can and should encourage more quantitative research into 
newer and ongoing political humor shows like Last Week Tonight.   
Adding further to the empirical difficulties, there is not much available data which can be 
used to conduct quantitative analyses on TCR.  Few political surveys ask if participants have 
watched the show, and to the knowledge of this research, there seems to be no panel data which 
can show clear causation paths.  Despite the multiple challenges and current gaps of the political 
humor and TCR literature, this research will contribute to the current field by using other 
methods to establish causality, filling some quantitative gaps with unique methodology, and 
devoting its focus to TCR and its empirical political effects on knowledge and participation. 
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CHAPTER III. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Hypotheses 
How much did TCR influence the political knowledge and participation of its viewers?  
Based upon the current literature, this study hypothesizes that 1) TCR had a significant and 
positive effect on viewers’ political knowledge.  Viewers frequently had exposure to many topics 
in American and world politics which were effectively and influentially presented according to 
the ELM model and other TCR literature (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008; Jones et al. 2012; 
Binford, 2015).  Therefore, watching the show should create an increased knowledge of politics, 
and this knowledge effect might even be greater than other political news shows.  In addition to 
this knowledge effect, this study also hypothesizes that 2) TCR had a significant and positive 
effect on viewers’ political participation.  The show frequently inspired viewers to participate in 
the political process through multiple channels such as events like The Rally to Restore Sanity 
and/or Fear and donations to political candidates via the “Colbert Bump”.  TCR viewers should 
show increased political participation more than non-viewers because of the influential and 
inspirational methods used throughout the show’s history as supported through previous 
literature (Lee & Kwak, 2014), yet this study does not believe the effect will hold across all 
individuals and political preferences.  This leads to the last hypothesis that 3) political party 
identification will modify the relationship between watching TCR and political participation with 
only Democrats showing a significant and positive rise in participation from TCR viewing.  
        According to the literature, both liberals and conservatives watched the program and 
found it to be entertaining and educational (Gaines, 2007).  The educational aspect of the show 
should not be affected by the political party identification of the viewer because partisanship 
should not affect the absorption of news, yet political participation could be affected due to 
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individuals’ abilities to understand the underlying messages of the show (LaMarre et al. 2009).  
Although not a perfect correlation, this study will use political identification as a proxy for 
political ideology with Democrats as liberal and Republicans as conservatives.  Democrats could 
potentially see the show’s message as a call to arms because they were able to see the veiled and 
implicit liberal messages, but it is likely that conservative Republicans were not incited by these 
calls because they took Colbert by his literal words.  To put all the hypotheses of this study 
together, Democrats should show higher levels of political participation than Republicans from 
watching the show, but both groups’ levels of political knowledge should be equally and 
positively affected due to no hypothesized moderating effect of partisanship on political 
knowledge.   
To test all three hypotheses, individual level survey data from the 2012 ANES 
Evaluations of Government and Society Study (henceforth EGSS4) and three Pew Research 
Center Biennial Media Consumption Surveys (henceforth Pew MCS Year) from 2008 to 2012 
will be analyzed.  All four surveys are nationally representative with large sample sizes and 
randomized collection methods.  The following table describes each survey through its methods, 
sample, and relation to the Colbert hypotheses. 
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Table 1 - Surveys 
Survey Respondents 
Colbert 
viewing 
% 
Sampling Administered 
Error 
(+-%) 
ANES 
2012 
EGSS4 
1314 9.50% 
Cross-sectional, telephone- and 
address-based representative samples 
of the national population of US adult 
citizens 
Internet, 
February 18-23 
2012 
Response Rate: 
2.5% 
(+-2.8%) 
Pew 
MCS 
2008 
Total: 3615. 
Colbert: 1824 
29.70% 
Combination of landline and cellular 
random digit dial (RDD) nationally 
representative of adults in the 
continental United States who have 
access to a phone. 
Telephone, April 
30-June1 2008. 
Response Rate: 
22% 
(+-1.9%) 
Pew 
MCS 
2010 
3006 37.80% Same as Pew MCS 2008 
Telephone, June 
8-June 28 2010. 
Response Rate: 
16.9%- 17.5% 
(+-1.9%) 
Pew 
MCS 
2012 
3003 35.30% Same as Pew MCS 2008 
Telephone, May 
9 -June 3 2012. 
Response Rate: 
6.7%-11.2% 
(+-2.1%) 
 
These four surveys will strengthen the analysis in ways that a single survey would not.  
Given that TCR ran for almost a decade, it would be hard to establish the effect of the show using 
only one survey.  As discussed before, the best dataset for this analysis would be a panel study 
that would record TCR viewing and the political characteristics of individuals throughout time; 
sadly, there are no such publicly available datasets.  However, given that the listed surveys span 
a timeframe of four years during Colbert’s show, this study can test whether TCR influenced 
political engagement throughout the years.  If the show has an effect only in one year rather than 
all, this will indicate that the show only had minimal influence on political engagement, but if it 
is consistent across the surveys, this strengthens the argument that the effects of TCR were not 
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merely passing.  Another benefit of using multiple surveys is that it can help determine if 
political season had any moderating effect on the show's influence to change political 
engagement.     
Perhaps the show only had an effect on individuals during presidential election years 
(EGSS4, Pew MCS 2008, Pew MCS 2012) instead of congressional election years (Pew MCS 
2010) when viewers might be more inclined to watch political news during these higher election 
turnout years (FairVote, 2016).  Having this variability will be able to potentially identify a 
difference in effect based on the political season.   
All the surveys were administered during national election years, but they were given at 
different times before each election.  Perhaps Colbert’s show only had an effect when the 
election season got closer.  If the Pew datasets administered six months before elections, instead 
of nine months like the EGSS4, show an effect, this can show how political season could be a 
moderating factor.  The different political times in these datasets along with how TCR viewing is 
measured will help establish the effects of TCR viewing.  Each dataset measures the independent 
and dependent variables slightly differently, and this can provide strength behind the analyses of 
each variable.  The multiple datasets also provide this study with the ability to measure the 
dependent variables in similar but varied ways. 
Dependent Variables 
 The first dependent variable of this study is political knowledge.  In the EGSS4 survey, 
there are four questions which shall be combined into a count variable of political knowledge.  In 
the Pew MCS surveys, political knowledge is a three-point scale in the 2008 survey and a four-
point scale in the 2010 and 2012 surveys.  Each correctly answered political question in each 
dataset will be attributed one point towards the political knowledge variable for each dataset.  As 
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the number increases from zero to its maximum of three or four depending on the dataset, the 
political knowledge score of the participant will show increased knowledge about politics
2
.  
Table 2 shows the distribution of respondents’ correct answers to the political knowledge 
questions across the surveys. 
 
 
Table 2 – Political Knowledge Scores 
  Number of Correct Answers Average 
Score 
Total 
Frequency Survey 0 1 2 3 4 
Pew MCS2008 27.4% 27.1% 23.0% 22.5% N/A 1.41 3615 
Pew MCS2010 13.0% 23.0% 26.1% 21.3% 16.7% 2.06 3006 
Pew MCS2012 13.0% 21.4% 22.3% 25.3% 17.9% 2.14 3003 
EGSS4 12.0% 16.4% 23.0% 27.6% 21.2% 2.30 1314 
Percent indicates the number of respondents in each survey’s score category divided by the total number of 
respondents from each respective survey.   
 
 
 
 The second dependent variable of this study is political participation.  As discussed 
before, political participation is a key factor in democratic societies because democracy is 
supported by an engaged citizenry.  If viewing TCR had an effect on political participation, these 
results could reveal how democratic societies can engage citizens in the political process through 
political humor in the media.  On the EGSS4, political participation will be a count variable from 
zero to five with higher levels indicating more political participation.  As each question has 
different response types, values of “one” and “zero” will be given to responses as shown in the 
appendix.  In addition to this aggregated political participation variable, each form of political 
participation ranging from minimal participation such as discussing politics with family and 
friends to more extensive participation including donating to political campaigns will be 
                                               
2
 Questions and their answers are presented in the appendix. 
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measured independently.  This will allow a more nuanced view into the effect of TCR on certain 
forms of political participation which could have required greater or lesser effort and resources.  
In the Pew MCS surveys, measuring political participation is extremely limited by their question 
sets; only one question on each MCS survey asks about being registered to vote.  This is not a 
compelling enough form of political participation to be worth the analysis.  Given that the 
EGSS4 has varied forms of political participation which accurately measure overall political 
participation more than voter registration, this study will only use the EGSS4 to analyze political 
participation. As with the political knowledge variable, it is impossible for this variable to 
completely summarize the entire political participation of individuals; however, both the political 
knowledge and participation variables will be proxies for individuals’ complete political 
engagement in both aspects. 
 
 
Table 3 – Political Participation Scores 
 
  Number of Experienced Political Participation Events   
Survey: EGSS4 
0 
(No) 
1 
(Yes) 
2 3 4 5 
Average  
Score 
Total 
Frequency 
Total Score 8.8% 30.7% 72.8% 19.1% 6.9% 1.1% 1.97 1314 
(Presidential Vote) 19.6% 80.4%           1314 
(Primary Vote) 83.3% 16.7%           1314 
(Discuss Politics) 25.0% 75.0%           1314 
(Campaign Button / 
Sticker) 88.7% 11.3%           
1314 
(Donate to 
Campaign) 86.5% 13.5%           
1314 
Percentages are the number of respondents in each score category divided by the total frequency. 
 
 
 
It can be generalized that individuals who answer affirmatively and correctly to these 
questions will most likely participate more in and know more about politics overall.  In addition, 
each of the questions is weighted equally towards the final variables of both aggregated political 
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participation and knowledge dependent variables.  One could argue that giving money to a 
political candidate constitutes more engaged political participation than voting or that knowing 
the Supreme Court Justice is more knowledgeable than knowing who controls Congress; 
however, this study will assume that each question is equally weighted in its importance for each 
dependent variable.  The variances in these two dependent variables of political knowledge and 
participation will be explained by one main independent variable of “watching TCR” and a list of 
control variables. 
Independent Variable 
“Watching TCR” will be the main independent variable in all the four datasets.  In the 
EGSS4 dataset, it is operationalized as a dummy variable coded “zero” for non-monthly viewers 
and “one” for monthly viewers.  This measure captures relatively frequent viewers of TCR, but it 
admittedly leaves out such factors as viewing frequency of watching the show more than once 
per month and level of interest in the program.  To account for these factors, the Pew MCS 
surveys measure TCR viewing by frequencies of “Never”, “Hardly Ever”, “Sometimes”, and 
“Regularly”.  
 
Table 4 – Watching TCR 
 
Never  
(< Once a Month) 
Hardly Ever/Sometimes/Regularly 
(> Once a Month) 
Total Frequency 
Surveys # % # % # 
Pew MCS2008 1282 70.3 542 29.7% 1824 
Pew MCS2010 1890 63.2 1102 36.8% 2992 
Pew MCS2012 1905 64.7 1041 35.3% 2946 
(EGSS4 2012) 1185 91.4 112 8.6 1297 
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Table 5 – Frequency of Watching 
 
Never Hardly Ever Sometimes Regularly Total Frequency 
Surveys # % # % # % # % # 
MCS2008 1282 70.3 186 10.2 254 13.9 102 5.6 1824 
MCS2010 1890 63.2 412 13.8 539 18 151 5.1 2992 
MCS2012 1905 64.7 392 13.3 513 17.4 136 4.6 2946 
 
 
 
At first glance, one large difference between the EGSS4 and Pew MCS surveys is their 
response rate for TCR viewing.  Only 8.6% in the EGSS4 said they watched the show “at least 
once a month” compared to 35.3% who said they watch the show “sometimes” or “regularly” in 
the same year as the Pew MCS2012 survey; however, this could be due simply to the fact that 
the Pew MCS surveys do not give a definite amount frequency to classify each category.  Upon 
viewing these 8.6% EGSS4 “at least once a month” viewers in terms of the Pew MCS “regular” 
and “sometimes” viewers in the Table 5, one can see that perhaps the Pew MCS respondents 
who indicated “sometimes” watched the show a little less than once a month and “regularly” did 
so more than once a month.  Although only a rough estimate, it does give a general sense of how 
to compare the variables from both survey methods
3
.   
Measuring TCR viewing in both dichotomous and more varied frequency terms will not 
only support if merely watching the show had an effect on political knowledge and participation; 
it will also test if intensity and engagement with the show was necessary to have an effect.  In 
comparison to non-viewers, viewers should show higher rates of political knowledge and 
participation due to the powerful influence, ability to appeal to both conservatives and liberals, 
                                               
3
 For comparison with the other news programs in this study, the average “more than never” viewing frequencies 
across the Pew surveys of the other television programs are as follows: CBS/ABC/NBC – 70%, CNN/MSNBC/FOX – 
80%, The Daily Show – 37%, and O'Reilly Factor – 43.3%.  As shown, each was more widely viewed than TCR. 
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and the educational programming of TCR.  To better isolate the effects of watching the program 
in relation to other factors, a list of control variables which can also affect participation and 
knowledge will be included in the statistical models. 
Control Variables 
Demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race, political party identification, 
partisan strength, level of education, and income level have all been shown to affect political 
knowledge and participation (Kenski & Stroud, 2006).  Intuitively, people who watch more news 
shows and read more newspapers have increased levels of political knowledge and participation 
(De Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Liu et al. 2013).  Therefore, these controls
4
 will be included 
in the models to better test the causality between watching TCR and political knowledge and 
participation.  Also, because previous political humor literature has been dominated by 
discussions of The Daily Show in relation to TCR, The Daily Show has been included as a control 
in the models.  When The Daily Show is not able to be used as a control in the Pew MCS 2008 
due to the questions about both shows being asked on non-overlapping forms, The O’Reilly 
Factor is used as a control in addition to separate models using only The Daily Show in order to 
compare the relative strength between the shows.  Using The Daily Show will also allow this 
study to measure the potential differences between satire and humor in political media.  As 
discussed before, both styles of humor can be quite influential towards their intended audiences, 
but satire has been shown to have a potential different effect based upon the message processed 
by the recipient (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008).  Using The Daily Show as a measure of humor 
and TCR as one of satire, one can see which method of political humor might be more influential 
and dominant at changing viewers’ political characteristics.     
                                               
4
 Coding of control variables for each survey can be found in the appendix. 
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Using these control variables along with the different political times, measures of 
variables, and different years of these surveys will help paint a more conclusive and statistically 
sound picture of the effects of TCR on political knowledge and participation. 
Methodology 
Because both dependent variables of this study are at interval levels, small in number 
size, and can be seen as increasing numbers of events occurring
5
, Poisson Count Model 
regressions using two-tailed tests and 95% confidence intervals will be conducted to test the 
effect of the independent variable (watching TCR) on two dependent variables (political 
knowledge and political participation).  When political participation is separated into its different 
forms, logit regression models will be used due to the binary nature (yes/no) of the participation 
types.  In addition to the main independent variable, a list of control variables will be included in 
the analyses.  This statistical control methodology contributes to the small literature previously 
conducted on TCR and political humor because of the current lack of non-experimental methods 
and nation-wide surveys in the literature.  Also to the knowledge of the author, it will be the first 
study to use the EGSS4 survey to study the effects of TCR on political knowledge and 
participation.  In addition to this contribution to the literature, this study will add to limited 
quantitative methods previously used to study TCR.  It aims to be broad scope of the show and 
its effects on viewers, and it hopes to do justice to the impact it left on American politics.   
 
                                               
5
 This study recognizes that OLS can also be used, but Poisson regression is more appropriate for this study because 
of the small values and positive nature of the dependent variables.   All models were also ran using OLS to see any 
significant differences in the regression outcomes.  Using OLS increases the number of statistically significant 
variables in some of the models, but it does not change the direction of their effects.  The overall analysis does not 
change by using OLS.  When significant differences between OLS and Poisson occur, they are noted in footnotes. 
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CHAPTER IV. POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The first hypothesis of this study is that watching TCR would positively affect viewers’ 
levels of political knowledge.  This study finds strong evidence to support this hypothesis.  TCR 
did in fact make viewers more knowledgeable about politics, with the educational effect of the 
show perhaps even stronger than national news and political humor programs.  Table 6 below 
shows the results of the multiple models conducted, each of which presents a more complete 
picture of how TCR held this educative power over time and even when held constant by other 
traditional and comparable political news sources.  For the three surveys which show TCR 
having a significant effect on political knowledge, Figure 1 shows how viewing TCR increased 
viewers’ political knowledge scores.  Although the show presents a strong effect across the many 
models and time periods, several points must be illuminated to understand how and why TCR 
was effective.  
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Figure 1 – A Rise in Truthiness 
 
 
 
Watching TCR holds a significant and positive effect on political knowledge across all 
time periods from 2008 to 2012.  To put some color to this, someone who never watched TCR, 
while holding all other variables constant, had a 13% chance of not getting a single answer 
correct on the Pew MCS 2012; however, regularly watching TCR lowered that same no correct 
answer probability by 5%.  In the Pew MCS 2010, TCR lowered the no correct answer 
probability by 4%, and although it is not held constant by The Daily Show in 2008, it lowered 
that same probability by 11%.  There seem to be no demonstrably different variations in the 
increases in political knowledge between the different viewing frequencies as demonstrated in 
Figure 1.  For example in the Pew MCS 2010 Model 5, jumping from “never” watching to 
“hardly ever” watching increased the political knowledge score by about .1 points, essentially the 
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same increase as jumping from “sometimes” to “regularly” watching.  This suggests that there 
was no magical point where only certain minimum frequency and above TCR viewers would 
benefit their political knowledge from watching the program; rather, it seems the relationship 
between viewing TCR and political knowledge was constant instead of increasing in intensity. 
This ascribes a certain long lasting and consistent educational power to the show as 
predicted.  This does not come as a surprise given Colbert’s viewership remained relatively 
constant over the years, indicating a continually interested viewership, and that he maintained his 
focus on political news and current events over the course of his show.  In surprising opposition 
of previous literature results, which claimed TCR as less impactful and important than The Daily 
Show, TCR seems to hold a stronger effect on political knowledge across time than The Daily 
Show
6
.  This is shown by comparing the standard models and the w/TDS (The Daily Show) 
models in the latter two Pew MCS surveys in which TCR eliminates the statistical significance of 
The Daily Show.  Following are some explanations which can be attributed to this finding. 
 First, political satire could be more effective at educating viewers than direct messaging 
types of political humor.  This comparative study of humor has not been the focus of much 
research, but it is crucial when determining the effectiveness of messaging.  Buijzen and 
Valkenberg (2004) expressed a need to differentiate between different humor types when 
analyzing their effectiveness, yet as discussed before, many studies have lumped these different 
humoristic categories together, eliminating the nuances that can be found between different 
forms.  Even within its own category of humor, different forms of satire can have varied effects 
on individuals.  Holbert et al. (2011) found that different satire forms were more effective at 
persuasion for different groups than others; however, what the scholars did not consider is their 
                                               
6
 When OLS is used, The Daily Show does gain statistical significance in the Pew MCS 2010; however, TCR still 
holds more statistical significance across the majority of models where both variables are included. 
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comparative effects on educating viewers.  Specifically for TCR, Baumgartner and Morris (2008) 
found that because of the potential overpowering of the explicit conservative message over the 
implicit liberal one, the effects of Colbert’s satirical program on persuading individuals were 
perhaps short lived.  However, the consistency of the three Pew surveys suggests that TCR in fact 
did have lasting effects on its viewership, even potentially more so than The Daily Show.  To 
better determine if political satire is more impactful than more direct political humor types, more 
experimental studies should be conducted using political satire and other humor types to convey 
the same message.  Additionally, research should include check ins through panel studies to see 
the effectiveness of different humor types at educating in the long run.  This leads to the next 
potential reason of the educational power of TCR: election season. 
 Second, TCR might have shown a larger effect than The Daily Show on political 
knowledge during times closer to national election cycles.  Observing both EGSS4 models, The 
Daily Show completely eliminates the statistical significance and reduces the TCR coefficient to 
almost zero.  While this effect is what previous literature has inferred, this decreased significance 
may also be explained by the moderating factor of the election cycle.  It is a point that 
Baumgartner and Morris (2008) make by stating, “[although the short-lived effects of TCR] are 
less than significant, it should be remembered that short-term effects can often have a powerful 
influence in politics, for example, in election campaigns (Baumgartner & Morris, 2008, p. 635).”  
When viewing the results through this election cycle lens, the pieces seem to come together.   
Each Pew MCS survey was administered during national elections years between late 
April and June, placing these surveys two to four months closer to the elections in November 
than the EGSS4 administered in February of the election year 2012.  This also places these 
surveys in political contexts closer to the latter primaries which ultimately seal the nominations.  
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Overall increased political attention around the party primaries and the national elections could 
have increased Colbert’s viewership and made it focus more on the political news segments of 
the show in order to learn from them.  When less attention was gathered around politics in the 
earlier parts of the year, people could have relied more on The Daily Show for their humor and 
political education fixes hence explaining the significance of this show in the EGSS4.    
When considering TCR’s effectiveness during congressional versus presidential elections, 
there seems to be no difference given that all the Pew surveys show statistical significance of 
TCR in both election cycle types, but future research should be conducted on how timing and 
political context of news shows can have an impact on their effectiveness.  Lastly, TCR could 
show more statistical significance than The Daily Show due to the segmentation of watching 
frequency. 
 Had this study only operationalized TCR viewing as a dichotomous yes/no factor, as 
does the EGSS4, the evaluation could have skewed more towards the effectiveness of The Daily 
Show.  By using a more continuous approach to viewing news, which teases out the effects of 
heavy viewing versus light viewing, the results show that TCR does hold a significant and 
positive impact, even more so than other news and political humor programs.  This indicates that 
viewers who watched TCR more than other programs benefited their political knowledge levels 
as their viewing frequency increased, but watching the program only infrequently would not 
allow strong knowledge gains for individuals.   
Although this study hypothesized that individuals, no matter their partisan ideology, 
would increase their political knowledge from watching TCR, it found results indicating that 
partisanship did influence how TCR educated viewers.  Table 7 lists the results of how political 
knowledge gains from TCR viewing were acknowledged solely by Independents and Democrats.  
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The sizeable Republican share of Colbert’s viewership, 15% in the EGSS4 and 21% in the Pew 
MCS 2010
7
, did not seem to gain political knowledge from watching the program.  Independents 
gained the most in political knowledge from watching TCR as their knowledge gains are seen 
across all the three Pew MCS surveys, but the effects for Democrats, the highest portion of TCR 
viewership, did not hold significance across the same surveys
8
.  None of the surveys showed any 
significant knowledge benefit for Republican TCR viewers, and some coefficients for 
Republicans, although not statistically significant, were negative.  Apparently, partisanship had a 
large factor to play, and those who were least partisan of all benefitted the most.  For political 
knowledge to stick, it appears that TCR’s satire needed to hit its target audience.   
 Although Republicans saw Colbert as being funny and entertaining (Lamarre et al. 2009), 
it seems entertainment was the full extent to which they benefited from the program.  Using the 
Uses and Gratifications Theory (McQuail, 1994), we can now see that a typical Republican 
viewer was probably using TCR for its humor and not its ability to inform because of the missing 
effect on their political knowledge.  For Democrats and Independents, we can see that they were 
probably using TCR for both its humor and informative power.  The information probably stuck 
for Democrats and Independents because they were able to understand the jokes hidden behind 
the explicit direct messaging and tie that humor to the knowledge.  To do this, Colbert would 
first have to set up the jokes like a teacher might structure a day’s lesson. 
  
 
 
 
                                               
7
 This is calculated as being Republican respondents who indicated “sometimes” or “regularly” to watching TCR. 
8
 When OLS is used, Democrats do show a statistically significant knowledge gain across all the Pew surveys. 
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Bringing in a pedagogical viewpoint, Colbert’s style was similar to the way in which 
some teachers structure lesson plans using a technique called 4MAT (Wilkerson & White, 1988).  
4MAT lesson plans have a specific structure which goes as follows.  First, teachers provide the 
important pieces of information through a lecture or more engaging forms.  Second, students 
practice the information through a relevant exercise with structure from the teacher.  After the 
practice, students are then told to do an application in which they create something personal to 
themselves in a less structured environment using the new knowledge and their previous 
knowledge and beliefs of the world.  Teachers, including this author, have found this lesson 
structure to be quite effective in enabling students to retain information (Wilkerson & White, 
1988).  Using this lesson planning frame, one can see why Colbert’s nightly “politics class” was 
effective.   
For TCR’s “4MAT lesson planning”, Colbert typically provided the relevant information 
by using news clips from major news networks.  These collections of news clips would be 
informative syntheses of the news itself and of the national news networks’ coverage, a frequent 
area of which Colbert enjoyed poking fun.  Next, to allow his viewers a space to practice this 
new information, he began to analyze the news using his comedic and overly conservative 
messaging techniques.  This practice in itself could potentially make a person remember the 
political news well enough because of the humor attached, yet Colbert would provide his viewers 
a next step to bring in their personal beliefs.  In the “application phase” of Colbert’s lessons, 
viewers would take their previous beliefs and knowledge of the world (either Colbert as a liberal 
satirist or an over-the-top conservative comedian), and apply it to his message. When viewers 
could use their previous knowledge of Colbert as a liberal satirist, they got the rewards of 
understanding the implicit message, seeing the satire between the explicit and implicit messages, 
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and engaging in a short but sweet laugh.  Conservative viewers would take their view of Colbert 
as a conservative comedian and understand the ridiculousness of the jokes in the direct messages, 
but they would not be able to grasp the true message Colbert was teaching in this phase of the 
lesson.   
The application phase would sometimes even extend into homework, giving viewers an 
opportunity to apply knowledge even after the lesson.  Through post show events like his super-
pac commercials and a candidacy for becoming the President of the United States of South 
Carolina, viewers were able to take lessons into the real world and apply them outside of the 
“classroom”.  Viewing his satire through this pedagogical lens, it makes sense why only 
Independent and Democrat viewers were the only ones to gain political knowledge from 
Colbert’s program.   
Republican viewers were only able to engage in the synthesis of information during the 
“practice” portions of Colbert’s lessons; they did not join in the application phase where the 
greatest gains may have resided.  Since Republicans’ lessons stopped at the practice, maybe their 
political knowledge gains did as well.  This could also explain why Colbert’s program held 
stronger political knowledge gain effects than The Daily Show.  Stewart’s lessons mostly only 
went up to the practice phase, tying the political news with a directly liberal joke.  If Stewart 
would have gone past that point by using more satire and stunts to make the information attached 
to the message even stickier, The Daily Show could have shown equal effects to those of TCR.  
To test power of satire as compared to other forms of humor at effective political education, 
future studies should conduct experiments measuring the short-term and long-term political 
knowledge gains of different styles of humor and techniques.   
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To put all of these implications together, TCR was an effective political educator across 
time, and it appears that because of the satirical style of his program, he was a more effective 
political educator than national news organizations and similarly minded political humor shows.  
The show probably functioned best in this role when viewers were more likely to pay attention to 
the political context closer to election times.  Only viewers who were able to see the liberal 
implicit messages and fully engage in the synthesis, practice, and application of Colbert’s satire 
could fully make that information stick in their long-term memories.  Now that TCR has stopped 
airing, Democrats and Independents have lost an effective way to become smarter about politics, 
but other programs do show promise in filling this gap like Last Week Tonight (Hoffman, 2015).  
Nonetheless, it is this author’s opinion that no one will ever instill as much “truthiness” as 
Colbert did.  
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CHAPTER V. POLITICAL PARTICIPATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Events like The Rally to Restore Sanity and/or Fear and previous literature discussing 
phenomena like the “Colbert Bump” demonstrate that TCR had some effects on viewers’ 
political participation.  This study hypothesized that TCR should have made viewers more likely 
to participate in politics in general and for specific political participation types, such as voting 
and donating to political campaigns, because of the show’s political nature and potentially large 
influence on viewers.  Based on the motivated reasoning effects of partisanship, this study also 
hypothesized that this motivation to participate effect would only be experienced by Democrats 
because they were the only ones who could understand the implicit liberal messaging and calls to 
arms of TCR.  However, negating the hypotheses of this study, the results point to no effect of 
TCR on political participation for neither political party nor participation type.  Statistical models 
demonstrating these political participation results are shown in Table 8.    
TCR shows no statistically significant effect in the main statistical model (Model 1) nor 
for any political identification group.  Characteristics that do show effects towards making 
individuals more likely to participate in politics are being older, having stronger political views, 
being more educated, reading the newspaper, and watching cable news such as Fox News.  
Commercial broadcast networks like ABC do not seem to hold any effect
9
, but this is not 
surprising given their focus on programming other than political news.  One interesting finding 
in addition to TCR having no effect was a shared lack of power by The Daily Show.   
 
 
  
                                               
9
 When OLS is used, the ABC/CBS/NBC variable does gain a statistically significant and positive effect for 
Democrats. 
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Table 8 – The Null Effects of TCR on Political Participation 
DV: Political 
Participation 
Model 1 Republicans Independents Democrats 
TCR 
0.064 
(.09) 
0.104 
(.18) 
0.059 
(.18) 
0.024 
(.13) 
White 
-0.097 
(.05) 
-0.158 
(.12) 
-0.087 
(.11) 
-0.062 
(.07) 
Independents 
-0.011 
(.06)    
Democrats 
0.019 
(.05)    
Income 
0.002 
(.01) 
-0.017 
(.01) 
0.01 
(.01) 
0.009 
(.01) 
Age 
0.008*** 
(.00) 
0.007** 
(.00) 
0.012*** 
(.00) 
0.005* 
(.00) 
Male 
0.023 
(.04) 
0.009 
(.07) 
0.003 
(.08) 
0.034 
(.07) 
Education 
0.133*** 
(.02) 
0.190*** 
(.04) 
0.149** 
(.05) 
0.063 
(.04) 
Partisan Strength 
0.125*** 
(.03) 
0.134** 
(.05) 
0.159* 
(.07) 
0.124** 
(.05) 
ABC/CBS/NBC 
0.027 
(.02) 
0.008 
(.04) 
0.015 
(.04) 
0.049 
(.04) 
CNN/MSNBC/FOX 
0.060* 
(.03) 
0.116* 
(.05) 
0.009 
(.05) 
0.055 
(.04) 
Daily Newspaper 
0.019* 
(.01) 
0.029* 
(.01) 
0.004 
(.02) 
0.018 
(.01) 
The Daily Show 
0.073 
(.08) 
0.077 
(.19) 
0.14 
(.17) 
0.111 
(.12) 
Constant 
-0.447** 
(.14) 
-0.38 
(.24) 
-0.796** 
(.25) 
-0.212 
(.20) 
N 1209 385 385 439 
Pseudo R
2
 0.047 0.06 0.045 0.036 
Poisson regression coefficients listed.  Significance levels: * < .05, ** < .01,  
*** < .001.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Unlike the results of this study for political knowledge, differences between political 
humor and political satire cannot be seen in their resulting levels of political participation, and 
therefore both seem to be equally ineffective.  News media types that do have an impact are 
news broadcast networks and daily newspaper reading.  These findings suggest that watching 
CNN and reading a local newspaper can be impactful media to increase political participation 
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among the general public, if that public is Republican
10
.  For all political partisan groups, 
watching TCR does not seem to get them to get off their couch and into the democratic process.  
This finding, although negating the hypothesis of this study, is not surprising given the fact that 
most Americans do not like to participate in politics, especially for frequent and time consuming 
events like local elections (FairVote, 2016).  However, what if TCR viewers were incited enough 
to do low effort political activities that could be done from the comfort of their couches like 
online donating to campaigns or wearing campaign buttons?  Table 9 explores this question, and 
it appears that no matter the level of effort of each participation type, TCR holds equally 
impotent on all forms of political participation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
10
 When OLS is used, the CNN/MSNBC/FOX and Daily Newspaper variables gain a statistically significant and 
positive effect for Democrats but not Independents. 
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Table 9 – The Effects of TCR on Forms of Political Participation 
Variable Presidential vote Primary Vote 
Campaign 
button / sticker 
Donate to 
Campaign 
Discuss 
Politics 
TCR 
0.271 
(.43) 
-0.251 
(.36) 
0.599 
(.37) 
-0.076 
(.38) 
0.715 
(.47) 
White 
-0.214 
(.23) 
-0.801*** 
(.19) 
-0.143 
(.25) 
-0.588* 
(.23) 
0.102 
(.19) 
Independents 
0.373 
(.25) 
-0.365 
(.25) 
-0.083 
(.32) 
-0.239 
(.30) 
0.052 
(.22) 
Democrats 
0.394 
(.23) 
0.139 
(.20) 
-0.097 
(.23) 
-0.26 
(.23) 
0.028 
(.19) 
Income 
0.042 
(.02) 
-0.015 
(.02) 
-0.04 
(.03) 
0.012 
(.03) 
0.011 
(.02) 
Age 
0.063*** 
(.01) 
-0.003 
(.01) 
0.011 
(.01) 
0.033*** 
(.01) 
0.016** 
(.01) 
Male 
-0.226 
(.18) 
0.123 
(.16) 
0.167 
(.19) 
0.18 
(.18) 
0.197 
(.15) 
Education 
0.842*** 
(.11) 
0.09 
(.09) 
0.266* 
(.12) 
0.349** 
(.11) 
0.527*** 
(.09) 
Partisan Strength 
0.715*** 
(.13) 
0.11 
(.11) 
0.530*** 
(.15) 
0.440** 
(.14) 
0.403*** 
(.11) 
ABC/CBS/NBC 
0.145 
(.10) 
0.069 
(.08) 
-0.006 
(.10) 
-0.044 
(.09) 
0.231** 
(.09) 
CNN/MSNBC/FOX 
-0.132 
(.12) 
0.267** 
(.10) 
0.139 
(.12) 
0.229* 
(.11) 
0.451*** 
(.11) 
Daily Newspaper 
0.021 
(.04) 
0.058 
(.03) 
0.138*** 
(.04) 
0.130*** 
(.03) 
0.027 
(.03) 
The Daily Show 
0.04 
(.40) 
0.077 
(.33) 
0.219 
(.36) 
0.639 
(.34) 
0.628 
(.40) 
Constant 
-5.575*** 
(.57) 
-1.551** 
(.48) 
-4.576*** 
(.66) 
-5.878*** 
(.68) 
-2.772*** 
(.46) 
N 1209 1209 1209 1209 1209 
Pseudo R
2
 0.273 0.05 0.09 0.136 0.135 
Logit coefficients listed. Significance levels: * < .05, ** < .01, *** < .001.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 TCR viewing holds no significant effect on any individual form of political participation, 
even for low involvement types like discussing politics with friends.  The Daily Show proved 
equally ineffective.  Media that did hold an effect on some participation types were cable news 
shows and reading a daily newspaper.  No type of media consumption was found to increase the 
likelihood of voting in a presidential election, yet for primary elections viewing cable news 
seems to increase the likelihood of primary voting.  For arguably the least costly and demanding 
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form of political participation, discussing politics, TCR does hold the highest coefficient out of 
all the media variables, but it does not hold any statistical significance.  These results disprove 
both political participation hypotheses by demonstrating the ineffectiveness of viewing TCR on 
incentivizing political participation. 
 The political events of TCR including his Rally to Restore Fear and/or Sanity and the 
pervasiveness of the “Colbert Bump” appear to be short-term anomalies briefly engaging viewers 
to join in the political process, and this finding contradicts prior studies claiming positive effects 
of increased viewing of news with political humor (Lee & Kwak, 2014; Becker, 2013; 
Baumgartner, 2008; Cao & Brewer, 2008).  A brief explanation might point to the difficulty of 
encouraging Americans to participate in the political process which can appear to many as boring 
and everlasting.  One could point to the specific ineffectiveness of political satire out of many 
humor types in this endeavor, but this would not explain the joint ineffectiveness of political 
humor as seen also with The Daily Show.  Perhaps political humor, including satire, is not 
effective because it does not overcome the problems of collective action and the difficulty to 
organize people on a large scale.  An approach for future studies would be to investigate 
attendance at political rallies and protests and how political humor shows can increase 
attendance for collective action events.  The null findings on participation could also be due to 
the timing of the surveys which perhaps did not provide enough recent political participation 
opportunities for people to indicate in their responses.   
Although the surveys were during presidential elections years and in the early primary 
cycles, many of the participation questions were based on campaign style events and gestures 
during the 12 months before the survey.  Only a truly fervent political person would donate to a 
campaign so far ahead of the national elections, and the so called early and late majority adopters 
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would probably not wear campaign flair until it were somewhat closer to the November 
elections.  Since a retrospective study asking for responses on November 9
th
 of the survey year is 
not feasible, future studies should look at how timing of surveys can affect the relationship 
between media usage and political participation types.  The lack of findings attributable to TCR 
could also be due to the theoretical model used in this thesis. 
This study proposed that being able to see Colbert’s implicit liberal messaging would 
encourage Democrat viewers to increase their participation, and perhaps this is an overly 
idealistic and simple model.  Models before have pointed to mediating effects which can affect 
the relationship between political humor and political participation (Lee & Kwak, 2014), and it 
could be that more complex models are better ways to study this relationship.  However, the 
study done by Lee & Kwak (2014) showed also a direct relationship between political satire
11
 
and political participation.  This does not provide an explanation behind the ineffectiveness as 
shown in this study.  Nonetheless, future studies should consider other paths through which 
political humor types can affect political participation and other political characteristics.  Finally, 
TCR might not have proved effective at changing political participation because it was not 
focused specifically on doing so. 
Colbert’s show did not have any goals like those found in typical political organizations.  
His main job per his own words was to entertain viewers (Mcgrath, 2012).  If there were a main 
objective which he did not explicitly state himself, it would be as a news program to inform 
viewers about the daily fluctuations of politics across the globe.  Satire was the medium through 
which he painted these nightly political pictures, and although it can be persuasive, it is hard to 
                                               
11
 To be clear, Lee & Kwak (2014) operationalize political satire as viewing a clip from The Daily Show in which 
Jon Stewart was using satire.  However, as a show in general, this study supports that Jon Stewart used more of a 
direct style to communicate his messages (simply named “humor”) as compared to TCR’s use of implicit messaging 
(simply named “satire”). 
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accomplish a goal when it is not the main objective of a cause.  By its very definition, news is 
meant to educate viewers on the current state of politics.  What viewers do with that knowledge 
is something that can be hard to control.  Although this study predicted that TCR would in fact 
both educate and engage viewers to participate in the democratic process, his program seems to 
only have been effective at the prior.  This finding alone has implications for political news 
shows that intend to use humor and satire, and other findings from this study point to a potential 
problem with the way in which political news is changing viewers’ political characteristics.  
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CHAPTER VI. INFORMED OR ACTIVE: CHOOSE ONE 
 Viewing the results split between Republicans and Democrats, there seem to be two 
troubling conclusions.  First, Democrats and Independents seem to gain political knowledge from 
watching TCR, but transitioning this knowledge into political action does not appear to occur.  
For those who are seeking to consume political media that will benefit their brains and their 
political capital through political participation, TCR and satire might not be the best choice.  If 
the show had done more political organizing efforts which had reached out to its younger and 
more liberally minded audience, perhaps TCR viewing could have increased voter turnout and 
other factors which raise one’s political influence.  Of course, there are a million hypotheticals 
regarding what the show could have done better, but there seems to be a disconnect between 
knowledge and action for Independent and Democrat viewers.  For TCR viewers, knowledge is 
not power.   
For other media sources like cable news, the outcome for Republicans seems to be the 
opposite of this this general intuition.  Democrats showed no statistically significant effect of 
television news viewing on either political knowledge or participation
12
.  This is a problem 
because Democrats are not becoming more engaged with politics from television news shows, 
arguably one of the most pervasive forms of mass communication in America.  However, the 
situation becomes more problematic when we look at Republicans.  To be blunt, cable news 
makes Republicans politically act without making them more knowledgeable of the political 
facts
13
.  Only two of the five statistical models in Table 7 showed a positive and statistically 
                                               
12
 When OLS is used, Democrats do show significant and positive effects of ABC/CBS/NBC and CNN/MSNBC/FOX 
on political participation; however, the more appropriate Poisson modeling shows each significance values of each 
variable far from the significance level of .05.  
13
 This analysis is based on the results from Poisson regression which is more appropriate for this study than OLS; 
however, when OLS is used, the effects of CBS/ABC/NBC on political knowledge for Republicans maintain a 
negative effect and become statistically significant in the Pew MCS 2008 and 2012 surveys.  OLS also causes the 
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significant effect of watching CNN/MSNBC/FOX on political knowledge for Republicans, and 
for the EGSS4 there was no significant effect.  On the same EGSS4, the only political 
participation survey, there is a statistically significant and positive effect of cable news getting 
Republican viewers to participate in multiple forms of political activity.  This is a disheartening 
combination. Although Republicans have a higher propensity to vote as shown in other studies 
(Shachar & Nalebuff, 1999), this influence on the political system is happening without 
increased knowledge from viewing cable news.  This flips the traditional saying of “knowledge 
is power” on its head, and it brings a serious question to this discussion. Could there be a source 
of news for Americans that educates and pushes people to the polls?  In a sense, could an actual 
conservative Stephen Colbert program for Republicans accomplish this?   
 Conservative political satire could be a very effective medium to accomplish educational 
and motivational political goals for Republicans.  As argued in this study, political satire gives 
viewers a chance to process information in an extensive and personal way.  For Republicans, it 
could close the educational gap that cable news is not filling.  So, does such a “real conservative” 
Colbert exist?  Yes, but they are not good.  Some conservative news shows have used political 
satire including The Flipside with Michael Loftus and Red Eye formerly featuring Greg Gutfeld.  
The first of these is no longer running, and Red Eye only airs at the least coveted 3 a.m. slot on 
Fox News.  There are probably more examples, but one thing is for sure: people are still “waiting 
for the conservative Jon Stewart” (Morrison, 2015).   
There seems to be a strange and deep connection between liberalism and humor which 
excludes conservatives from having a political humor show.  Morrison (2015) offers up some 
                                                                                                                                                       
CNN/MSNBC/FOX variable for Republicans to maintain positive and become statistically significant in the Pew 
MCS 2010 and the EGSS4.  Although these two groupings of news programming are different from each other, it 
can be argued that traditional television news programming in general does not seem to have a net positive outcome 
for Republicans’ political knowledge regardless of which modeling technique is used.  
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suggestions of why this is the case including an argument of liberal personality traits are more 
congruent with becoming a comedian than conservative ones, but some have gone farther 
indicting the very basis of conservatism as being incongruent with satire.  As Alison Dagnes 
writes in her book A Conservative Walks into a Bar, “Conservatism supports institutions and 
satire aims to knock these institutions down a peg (Dagnes, 2012, p. 212).”  With these two large 
barriers, it seems unlikely for a true conservative TCR to appear, but such a show could become 
quite influential.  For now though, liberal political humor and satire dominate this genre, and it 
appears certain that a “true conservative” Stephen Colbert will not be gracing the late night scene 
any time soon.   
So what are partisans to do with political news that does not cover both bases?  
Unfortunately, this study provides no answers.  It is a tall order to ask for political media which 
can both educate and inspire viewers to participate in politics; for the difficult case of America’s 
low levels of both, it would probably require an extremely savvy and influential program.  It is 
an important question if political humor news programs can or already are doing this, and 
perhaps a program does not even need humor to educate and motivate.  One thing is for sure 
though: TCR effectively handled the educational side of the equation for Independents and 
Democrats.  Considering Colbert was not going for either, one out of two is not bad. 
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CHAPTER VII. CONCLUSION 
Colbert has moved on to ventures in which he is not forced to constantly stay in his 
conservative character.  Now on The Late Show on CBS, he frequently dips his toes back into 
political punditry, but it is not the same.  His satire does not cut as deep.  His bits are not as 
potent.  Colbert has removed himself from being an influential source of news to becoming just 
another late-night talk show host, and past literature demonstrates that these shows do not do 
much for viewers’ political sophistication.  Before switching over to his new network, one must 
ask if Colbert had seen the academic literature testifying the positive impacts that TCR held on 
multiple facets of American democracy.  The weight and pressure alone would probably be 
enough to push many out and into less stressful positions, but it is honorable that Colbert would 
man this post in the fight for “truthiness” for almost a decade.  During this time, he made 
Americans laugh while inadvertently making them learn about politics.  His scope was endless; 
his tactics, hilarious.  Without TCR, millions would have never learned about topics such as the 
Citizens United court case on campaign-finance which was beautifully taught through his 
creation of a super-pac named “Americans for a Better Tomorrow, Tomorrow”.  Colbert himself 
even admitted on his show on June 4th, 2014: 
“Folks if you watch this show, you know I don’t like to toot my own horn.  As a 
Catholic, I was taught that self-tooting is a sin.  But tonight I’m compelled to 
take a moment to recognize someone else’s recognition of me.  Jim? 
[Shows CNN clip discussing an academic study about TCR.]   
That’s right. I did a better job informing the public about campaign-finance 
reform than every other news organization and CNN.”                           
(Colbert & Hoskinson, 2014). 
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This study concurs with the study that Colbert was referencing (Hardy et al. 2014) and 
others which pronounce significant educational gains for both individuals and society from 
watching the show.  It should be no surprise that he made viewers smarter about politics, but 
what is novel about this finding is that Colbert was even better at doing this than his former boss 
on The Daily Show. Colbert was willing to put his own skin in the game to create effective and 
influential programming.  Someone willing to create an Iowa caucus ad, which can only be 
described as “soft-core corn porn”, to show the power of money in politics had to have a 
powerful effect on the American political system at large.   
Although he was an effective educator because of his varied satirical and over-the-top 
methods, Colbert was not able to do the same when it came to motivating viewers to participate 
in politics.  Future political humor news programming can learn from the strengths and 
weaknesses of TCR to create even more effective politically engaging news.  Whether the effects 
of TCR can be copied by future political humor shows is open for discussion.  John Oliver has 
been able to take a large role in this space after both Colbert and Stewart left their posts, but 
Oliver’s Last Week Tonight might not be enough.  In a world where real news is now called fake 
news by the leader of the free world, a strong and influential voice is needed to bring truth to the 
lies and light to the political darkness.  “Fake” news is now real news, and TCR, arguably the 
most fake of them all, has left the building with sweetness
14
 in hand.   
During his last episode, Colbert left the set and into eternity singing “We’ll Meet Again”.  
It was a touching moment, and an interesting choice of song.  Will we ever meet the “real” 
Stephen Colbert again?  I personally hope we do.  And that’s the word. 
 
 
                                               
14
 Sweetness was the name of Colbert’s gun, one of his most favorite props. 
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APPENDIX A. EGSS4 CODING 
Political Knowledge 
1. Who is the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court? – 1, John Roberts  
2. Who is the Prime Minister of the U.K.? – 1, David Cameron 
3. Who is the Speaker of the House of Representatives? – 1, John Boehner 
4. On which of the following does the U.S. Federal Government spend the least? –  1, 
Foreign aid 
 
Political Participation 
1. Presidential Vote – Did you happen to vote in the 2008 presidential election?  - No will be 
given a “zero”, and yes a “one”. 
2. Primary Vote – Which one of the following best describes what you (have done so far in this 
upcoming election) / (did in the caucuses/primary)?   “(Definitely have not voted yet in the 
caucus or primary), (Not completely sure whether you voted or not), and (Definitely did not 
vote in a [caucus/primary/caucus or primary]) will be given a “zero”.  (Definitely voted in 
person at a polling place before/on election day), (Definitely voted by mailing a ballot to 
elections officials before election day), and (Definitely voted in some other way) will be given 
a “one”. 
3. Discuss Politics – Do you ever discuss politics with your friends or family? – No will be 
given a “zero”, and yes will be given a “one”. 
4. Campaign Button / Sticker – During the past 12 months, have you worn a campaign button, 
put a campaign sticker on your car, or placed a sign in your window or in front of your house, 
or have you not done this in the past 12 months? – No will be given a “zero”, and yes will be 
given a “one”. 
5. Donate to Campaign – During the past 12 months, have you given money to any candidate 
running for public office, any political party, or any other group that supported or opposed 
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candidates, or have you not done this in the past 12 months? – No will be given a “zero”, and 
yes will be given a “one”. 
 
Control Variables 
1. Age – Coded as the individual’s reported age in years.   
2. Male – Coded as “zero” for female and “one” for male.   
3. White – Coded as “zero” for non-white and “one” for white.   
4. Party Ideology – Coded as “one” for Republican, “two” for independent, and “three” for 
democrat.  The variable is run in the main models using each as a dummy variable with 
Republican as the base. 
5. Partisan Strength – Response to the question, “When it comes to politics, would you 
describe yourself, and these groups, as liberal, conservative, or neither liberal nor 
conservative?” Neither liberal nor conservative coded as “zero”, closer to 
conservatives/liberals as “one”, somewhat liberal/conservative as “two”, very 
liberal/conservative as “three”. 
6. Education -  Less than high school coded as “one”, high school as “two”, some college as 
“three”, bachelor’s degree or higher as “four”.   
7. Income – Total household income in the past 12 months.  Coded based on the 19 income 
categories in the c4_ppincimp variable. 
8. ABC/CBS/NBC – Aggregated answer to the question, “Below are some television programs. 
Which of these do you watch at least once per month? ABC World News, CBS Evening 
News, NBC Nightly News.” None coded as “zero”, one program as “one”, two programs as 
“two”, all as “three”. 
9. CNN/MSNBC/FOX -  Aggregated answer to the question, “Below are some television 
programs. Which of these do you watch at least once per month?  CNN Newsroom/Headline 
News, MSNBC Live, Fox News.” None coded as “zero”, one program as “one”, two 
programs as “two”, all as “three”. 
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10. Daily Newspaper -  Variable coded as the numerical answer to the question ranging from 
zero to seven, “During a typical week, how many days do you read news in a printed 
newspaper, not including sports?”   
11. The Daily Show – Response to the question, “Below are some television programs. Which of 
these do you watch at least once per month? The Daily Show”.  Coded as “zero” for doesn’t 
watch and “one” for does watch. 
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APPENDIX B. PEW MCS 2008 CODING 
Political Knowledge 
1. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of 
Representatives? 1, Democrat  
2. Can you tell me the name of the current U.S. Secretary of State? - 1, Condoleezza 
Rice/Condi/Rice  
3. Who is the current prime minister of Great Britain? Is it… - 1, Gordon Brown  
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APPENDIX C. PEW MCS 2010 CODING 
Political Knowledge 
1. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of 
Representatives? – 1, Democrats  
2. Can you tell me which company Steve Jobs is the head of? Is it…  - 1, Apple 
3. Do you happen to know who Eric Holder is? Is he…- 1, The U.S Attorney General 
4. Can you name the country where a recent volcanic eruption disrupted international air 
travel? - 1, Iceland 
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APPENDIX D. PEW MCS 2012 CODING 
Political Knowledge 
1. Do you happen to know which political party has a majority in the U.S. House of 
Representatives? – 1, Republicans 
2. Do you happen to know if the national unemployment rate as reported by the 
government is currently closer to…? – 1, 8% 
3. Is Angela Merkel the leader of …? - 1, Germany 
4. Which person – Mitt Romney or Barack Obama – is more supportive of increasing 
taxes on higher income people? – 1, Barack Obama 
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APPENDIX E. ALL PEW MCS CONTROL VARIABLES CODING 
 Control Variables 
1. White – Non-white is coded as “zero” and white is coded as “one”. 
2. Political Party Identification – Republicans are coded as “one”, Independents as “two”, 
Democrats as “three”.  The variable is run in the main models using each as a dummy 
variable with Republican as the base. 
3. Income – Response to the question, “Last year, that is in [year before survey], what was 
your total family income from all sources, before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the 
right category.” Coded based on the nine categories in the INCOME variable in the 
datasets. 
4. Age – The whole number in years of a person’s age. 
5. Male – Male is coded as “one” and female is “zero”. 
6. Education - some high school coded as “one”, high school coded as “two”, some college 
coded as “three”, college grad coded as “four”. 
7. Partisan Strength – Response to the question, “In general, would you describe your 
political views as very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?” 
Moderate and don’t know coded as “zero”, liberal and conservative coded as “one”, and 
very conservative and very liberal coded as “two”. 
8. CBS/ABC/NBC - Response to the question, “How often do you watch “The O’Reilly 
Factor” with Bill O’Reilly?  Never coded as “zero”, hardly ever coded as “one”, 
sometimes coded as “two”, and regularly coded as “three”.  [In Pew MCS 2008 when the 
variable when these shows were not connected into one variable and were instead asked 
individually for each show, this study combined the three variables (CBS, ABC, and 
NBC) into one.]   
9. CNN/MSNBC/FOX – Response to the question, “How often do you watch cable news 
channels such as CNN, MSNBC, or the Fox News CABLE Channel?” Never coded as 
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“zero”, hardly ever coded as “one”, sometimes coded as “two”, and regularly coded as 
“three”.  [When these shows were not connected into one variable and were instead asked 
individually for each show, this study combined the three variables (CNN, MSNBC, and 
FOX) into one.]   
10. Daily Newspaper – Response to the question, “How often do you read a daily 
newspaper?” Never coded as “zero”, hardly ever coded as “one”, sometimes coded as 
“two”, and regularly coded as “three” 
11. [In MCS 2008] O’Reilly Factor – Response to the question, “How often do you watch 
“The O’Reilly Factor” with Bill O’Reilly?  Never coded as “zero”, hardly ever coded as 
“one”, sometimes coded as “two”, and regularly coded as “three”.  
12. The Daily Show - Response to the question, “How often do you watch “The Daily Show” 
with Jon Stewart?  Never coded as “zero”, hardly ever coded as “one”, sometimes coded 
as “two”, and regularly coded as “three”. 
 
 
 
 
